''I am a tool of nobody."
- Iyad Allawi, Interim Iraqi PM, September 23, 2004
Ann Kornblut,
writing in the Boston Globe, echoed comments ricocheting around the Web yesterday when she noted that, “Apart from the heavy Iraqi accent, [Iyad Allawi] sounded almost like a Republican official introducing President Bush at a campaign stop.”
Though she overstates her case a bit, she didn’t pull it entirely out her ass; she found some Democrats to go on record with the same charge and the similarities in tone and phrasing between Allawi’s comments struck several other, admittedly liberal commentators. If you read the
transcript from yesterday’s Rose Garden press conference, you get plenty of good and bad on this count and it breaks about even.
For instance, Kornblut seized on one statement in particular to support her equation of Allawi as Bushie shill:
“I know it is difficult, but the coalition must stand firm. When governments negotiate with terrorists, everyone in the free world suffers. When political leaders sound the sirens of defeatism in the face of terrorism, it only encourages more violence. Working together, we will defeat the killers, and we'll do this by refusing to bargain about our most fundamental principles.”
“I understand why, faced with the daily headlines, there are those doubts. I know, too, that there are -- there will be many more setbacks and obstacles to overcome. But these doubters underestimate our country and they risk fueling the hopes of terrorism.”
Who could those doubters be?
In fairness to Allawi, he’s standing smack next to the hand that feeds him. Wisdom often trumps candor in such settings.
Returning to those comments themselves, and when dealing with anything or anyone Touched by Bush – as Allawi most certainly is - it’s
always useful to watch what they do, not what they say. For instance, an obvious example came with
Allawi’s offer of amnesty to insurgents in late August in the wake of the latest Sadrist uprising; American advisors muted the proposal to irrelevance because it originally extended even to Iraqis who had killed American soldier, as clear a statement as needed, really, as to the limits on Iraqi sovereignty. In this case, though, there’s also something to be learned by reading what else Allawi said.
In some of his comments Allawi is playing a double-game familiar to anyone versed in Bushie rhetoric, lumping all those attacking Americans and Iraqis under the general rubric of “killers” and “terrorists.” He builds on this by hinting at the old canard about not negotiating with terrorists. This is all part of the larger, botched equation: the notion that in the “central front” of Iraq, as well as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as a whole, all the various players, from former Baathists to Al Qaeda nutters, are fighting the same fight.
Move down to the Q & A, however, and he discusses negotiating with “killers” and “terrorists” – and at length to boot. In doing so, Allawi lets the proverbial cat out of the bag. All observers of the insurgency I’ve read reject the notion of an over-arching insurgency. They argue instead that we’re facing a series of smaller, self-interested “insurgencies,” each of them overlapping in what Good Ol’ Rummy would dub “coalitions of convenience.” Allawi recognizes this when he describes his talks with Sunni tribesmen and his attempts to pry them away from the “foreign fighters” and into the political process:
“There are insurgents and terrorists who are active there for geographical reasons. The people of Fallujah are adamant that they should -- whenever they are capable -- to get rid of the insurgents. We have been talking to them, I have been talking to them, engaged in dialogue.”
While you can accuse Allawi of abusing language – the “people of Fallujah” have demonstrated overt, widespread hostility to the occupation – his comments on Fallujah get at the largest hole in entire “global war on terror without negotiation” fallacy. Hostility toward the “occupier” brings all the “mini-insurgencies” together: without it, separate, even competing interests come to the fore (and, logically, augur the potential civil war reportedly described in the July National Intelligence Estimate that our president dismissed as a “guess” last week). Allawi’s rhetorical posturing aside, his government IS negotiating with “terrorists” and “insurgents,” even in Fallujah, the name brand city of Iraqi refusal. What’s more, he’s right to do so. Negotiations ended the standoff in Najaf earlier this month: Sadr backed down, but only after a face-saving cover provided by
Ayatollah Ali Sistani, cover which continued yesterday, perhaps as part of a larger bargain to sideline Sadr.
Quietly, the same approach is coming to Fallujah. The
Washington Post, quoting American commanders, suggest that “precision air-strikes” inside Fallujah are
producing rifts between the “foreign fighters” and the natives (if you look for this info in the link, you've got to go pretty frickin' deep, but it’s in there). These air-raids work hand-in-hand with the dialogue Allawi described in yesterday’s “presser” (love the journalism-geek slang):
“If you do not want the multinational force in Iraq -- I was talking to Fallujah people recently, to tribes, ex-army officers, ex-Saddam loyalists -- if you want the multinational force out, win the elections, go to the United Nations, talk to the Security Council, and tell them we don't need the multinational forces. But I tell you what is going to happen. If you ask the multinational force to leave prematurely -- this is me talking to the Fallujah people -- your country will be in ruins, and we cannot now, on our feet, stand and fight terrorism and global terrorism.”
Contained in all of that is a crucial point, both for Iraq and the GWOT: We are NOT fighting a single, unified political movement. One of the first, if not the first, steps in winning this fight comes with striking at those fissures, breaking down these “coalitions of convenience.” This will require negotiations with those who have claims and grievances that can be realistically accommodated and violence against those whose grievances cannot. Removing these aggravators – for example, returning Iraq to the Iraqis as soon and as completely as possible, as well as shifting our rhetoric to match – offers the best hope for isolating the die-hard jihadis, who live only for war and take savage, ultimately (hopefully?) meaningless potshots at progress that they have no real hope of stopping, at least not on the global stage. Alarmingly, they might pull this off in Iraq.
While Allawi behaves as if he understands this, he lends credence to Democratic suspicions by employing the same dip-shit cowboy rhetoric that our president loves so well, simple-minded terms of abuse that do nothing so much as keep the rest of the world on edge while convincing too many Muslims that the West is warring against their faith. Rather than corral disparate groups into armed and paranoid unity, why not isolate the true terrorists in both language and action?
In the meantime, Allawi’s comments prompt suspicions that he’s picking sides in the 2004 election. He let out more than a few howlers, including suggestions that 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces are “completely safe.” Wha? But siding nakedly with Bush raises another issue: What’s happens if John Kerry takes over next January?